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ABSTRACT
Since the advent of Napster, the idea of peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures being applied to
file-sharing applications has become popular, spawning other P2P networks like Gnutella,
Morpheus, Kazaa, and BitTorrent. This growth in P2P development has nearly eradicated the
idea of the traditional client-server structure in the file-sharing model, now placing emphasizes
on faster query processing, deeper levels of decentralism, and methods to protect against
copyright law violation.
SARP Net is a secure, anonymous, decentralized, P2P overlay network that is designed to
protect the activity of its users in its own file-sharing community. It is secure in the fact that
public-key encryption is used to guard eavesdroppers during messages. The protocol guarantees
user anonymity by incorporating message hopping from node to node to prevent any network
observer from pinpointing the origin of any file query or shared-file source. To further enhance
the system’s security, a reputation scheme is incorporated to police nodes from malicious
activity, maintain the overlay’s topology, and enforce rules to protect node identity.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of Napster, the idea of peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures being applied to
file-sharing applications has become popular, spawning other commercial peer-to-peers like
Gnutella, Grokster, Morpheus, Kazaa, eDonkey, and BitTorrent. This growth in P2P
development has nearly eradicated the idea of the traditional client-server structure in the file
sharing model, placing emphasizes on distributed and faster query processing, deeper levels of
decentralism, and methods to protect user identities to avoid copy-right violation prosecution.
The gain in popularity of the P2P paradigm has attracted all walks of life to attempt to
benefit from the potential power of any P2P system. In many cases, P2P networks provide users
with a collection of computer resources to exploit and use for personal benefit. In a P2P network
designed to distribute workload to multiple computers, the workload can be accomplished faster
and less resource-expensive than using a single computer or a multiprocessor machine. The most
well-known example of this is the SETI@Home project that distributes mathematical
calculations to its peers for research [30].
Security-wise, P2P systems run the risk of exposing their users to several security threats.
Common attacks and malicious activities performed on nodes include distributed denial-ofservice (DDOS) attacks, poisoning attacks, IP harvesting, flooding, data relay refusal, malware
distribution, and leeching (nodes refusing to share data but are willing to query and download
data) [32]. These threats run the risk of seriously compromising networks, damaging a system’s
safety credibility, and spreading malicious content such as viruses and worms.
SARP Net, the proposed model, is the structure of a completely decentralized filesharing system that incorporates heavy security mechanisms while supporting efficient queries,
1

fault tolerance, and other features desired by typical file-sharing applications. Its main goal is to
help maintain a high level of security for its users while protecting their identities through
message hopping.
The main contributions of this work include the model’s reputation scheme and the
system’s open design. The reputation scheme described in this work builds off of the idea that
friend-to-friend networks help establish an automatic web-of-trust that can be utilized to filter
out malicious nodes. The system’s robust open design allows many areas of the protocol and
node functionality to be extended to support a large number of different distributed computing
features. This takes away the limitation that this system is only designed for file-sharing. The
system can easily be customized to help distribute streaming multimedia, web browsing, file
storage, document publication, and malware alerts.
SARP Net is described in detail in the following chapters. First, a background about P2P
systems is provided, followed by a survey of the most prevalent P2P security issues and related
work. Finally, SARP Net is discussed, accompanied with the experiments, results, conclusion,
and future work.
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND
Since the advent of Napster in 1999, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology has received
overwhelming levels of interest [16]. This spark in attention has influenced a technological
revolution from centralized servers dominating socket-connected systems to the use of a
decentralized flow of information. P2P protocols are now being employed in many different
facets of information sharing across the internet-medium. Such uses include file sharing, instant
messaging systems, streaming multimedia, and distributed computing.
The definitive quality that any “true” P2P system possesses is the absence of a centralized
server [9]. All nodes in a true P2P network have the ability to portray any role and possess any
privilege the network offers. Typically, in the client-server model, servers and hosts have higher
privileges than the clients they serve. In the place of this centralized host, decentralized networks
have intricate architectures of computers that relay data among each other. Since the main
interest of any P2P network is to distribute data and workload in an efficient manner, most of the
major innovations in P2P file-sharing design have focused on file distribution speed and query
performance.
The following sections provide an understanding of the different types of P2P networks,
their strengths and weaknesses, centralized versus decentralized P2P networks, and potential P2P
problems and solutions.

2.1 Centralized Servers:
By definition, a centralized network is a system that possesses a centralized server who
relays all queries and responses to other entities in the system. These main hosts and servers are
3

given the highest level of privilege and ultimately controls all interactions between computers
connected to the network [20]. This structure is most commonly known as a client-server
architecture where clients are the computers who make queries, requests, and file transfers in the
system. Servers are the host computers who accept these queries and requests from clients and
relay the data to other nodes. Figure 1 depicts how in a small and simple client-server network
one server could be responsible for all requests from its clients.
The client-server architecture tends to be the most basic design of internet
communication between two or more computers where clients are initializing and executing
messages and servers are relaying them. This holds true in the realm of P2P networking. In the
case of file-sharing P2P networking, a centralized server accepts all client connections and relays
commands initializing file searches, file transfers, chat messages, and other network requests to
all or a subset of connected clients.

Figure 1: Client-Sever Architecture
Napster is the most well-known centralized file-sharing network to date. Even though its
architecture has a few complex components and has been modified over the years, the original
1999 Napster uses all of the basics of a centralized P2P system.
4

Each Napster client connects to multiple servers through a single session on the network.
When a client attempts to log into the Napster network, the client first connects to a main server.
This main server accepts or rejects a client’s personal information, including a username,
password, email address, and the number of files that the client will share. If the client was
accepted, a directory server receives a listing of all the files the client will share. The directory
server handles all queries for file searches. When the client wishes to perform a file search the
client would sends a message with the search criteria to the directory server and wait for a
response. If the server has a listing of that file in its shared files look-up table, it will reply with
the file’s basic information such as the file’s source, file name, and file size. To download a file
the client establishes a connection to the file source who is already listening to a designated port.
Next, the requesting node notifies the file source of which file is to be transferred, and depending
if authorization is granted, the file will then be transmitted through that connection. More
detailed information can be found at [2] or [3] about Napster.
The rate at which a query result is returned to a client is extremely fast in centralized
networks in comparison to other designs. In Napster’s case, since the directory server has a
listing of all files and host addresses, only one computer has to execute a search. Other many
other centralized designs distribute the search workload at the cost of forwarding query
messages. Here, once a server receives a query message, it will relay the message to a subset of
its clients where each recipient will search for the file on its own and send the results of the
query back to the server. The server will then gather all of the results and relay them back to the
requesting client. Even though this is not as fast as Napster’s implementation, this method saves
the centralized server from performing a lot of searches and requiring clients to upload their
shared file listings at the cost of relaying query messages.
5

The centralized genre of P2P architecture comes with a couple of noteworthy problems.
The first is the need for fast, reliable servers. These servers have to possess enough bandwidth
and resources to handle a magnitude of incoming and outgoing data at once. The major
disadvantage of centralized P2P networks is its dependency on a small number of computers. If a
server goes down due to power failure, security breaches, or network activity overload, the entire
system can halt and connections will be dropped. With this flaw, centralized systems suffer from
a lack of fault tolerance.

2.2 Decentralized Servers:
A decentralized network is a system that distributes the hosting responsibilities among
other computers [4]. This absence of critical central servers creates a need for a scheme to handle
all connections and queries in a way that does not place a large workload on any single network
entity yet guaranteeing a sense of operational reliability. Figure 2 displays a decentralized
formation, where clients share responsibilities in order to process network data, make requests,
and maintain the topology it the network. Notice the lack of a central host.

Figure 2: Decentralized P2P Architecture
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In a decentralized design, several issues arise when developing a working scheme. The
biggest issue is to assign incoming connections to already-connected peers. This requires a
connection between an incoming client and a server before the client can connect to other peers.
In the connection, the server will assign the client one or more addresses to connect to in order to
join the network. Typically, this assignment will initiate a connection to other peers or one of
many servers in the already established system. The problem that this bootstrap server causes is
that it automatically forces any decentralized system to have a centralized point since all clients
must primarily connect to a single server whose address never changes and is known by all
clients. The compromise this issue has spawned deals with logic: since nodes that are new to the
network must receive information about who to connect to, nodes must know at least one other
computer to connect to. Without some sort of bootstrapping information, a node can never join
the system so a bootstrap server is needed.
Other concerns with a decentralized architecture are their handling of security and
reliability issues. Since all decentralized networks have either multiple peer-servers or force
queries to go through several chains of peers, message interception and system vulnerabilities
can easily be exploited. Messages being relayed from one peer to another can always be captured
by intermediate connections. Even though most P2P networks pass encrypted messages between
peers this security technique combats threats from attacks outside of the system. Meaning that
messages containing query information must be decrypted and known by all reached clients,
malicious intermediate peers can easily extract file search strings, query results, and IP addresses
of the requesting client and peers who satisfy the requests if a protection system is not
implemented.
7

Typically, decentralized systems perform queries slower than its centralized counterpart.
In truly decentralized systems, query messages must traverse a web of peers before propagating
back to the requesting client. In comparison to a centralized design, where one message is sent to
a single server and the server sends the result back to the requesting computer, it is easy to see
how the speed differs between the two different schemes [4]. When multiple peer-servers are
used in a decentralized system, the query speed can be similar to Napster’s centralized design if
each peer-server acts in the same manner as Napster’s directory server.

2.3 Popular File-Sharing P2Ps:
There are many different techniques to design a decentralized system. Some of the most
innovative implementations have been designed by commercial institutions which have spawned
P2P file sharing applications such as Gnutella, Morpheus, KaZaa, BitTorrent, and E-Mule to
name a few. Each system provides a unique design of a file-sharing network with features that
focus on query and file transfer speed.

2.3.1 Gnutella:
The Gnutella protocol is among the most popular P2P designs to date. It was the first
mainstream file-sharing protocol to use a decentralized server in 2000. The first two generations
of the Gnutella network have influenced the P2P file-sharing community immensely. From 2000
to 2002 the first generation (Gnutella versions 0.1-0.6) was heavily decentralized and seemed to
be the best implementation of a “true” P2P system with the existence of bootstrap servers. In
2002, Gnutella 2 was developed. This second generation recognized the main problems faced in
8

the first Gnutella versions and sought to correct them by stepping away from decentralization in
its design to handle peer connections. Both generations will now be discussed, describing the
three main issues both architectures addresses: how peers connect to the network, how
disconnections are handled, and how queries are performed. Complete descriptions of Gnutella
can be found at [12] and [31].
The best way to describe the first generation of Gnutella is as a complex network of peers
who pass messages to each other without an intermediary. The creators of Gnutella gave each
peer the title of “servent” which denotes a merger between the typical network roles of server
and client. This means that each Gnutella node acts as both a client and server to other peers,
handling message relays and query operations.
When a client wants to join the Gnutella network, the client must obtain a list of already
connected servents. This list can be acquired by connecting to a bootstrap server whose sole
purpose is to collect IP addresses of servents and relay all or a subset of them to connecting
computers. Once a computer has a list of servents, it will attempt to connect to a subset of them.
Any servents addresses that are not accepting connections will be discarded.
Queries are handled in a web based manner for this version of Gnutella. To initialize a
file query, a servent will send a query message to all of the servents it is connected to. This query
message will contain the query command tag, the text string to search for, the IP address of the
requesting servent, and the search depth. Each servent will perform the query and forward the
message to the other servents it is connected to. This step is repeated until the search depth has
been reached. If one of the servents has the requested file then it will send a message with the file
information directly to requesting servent by establishing a connection if one does not already
exist. If the requesting servent wants to download a file specified in the query results then a
9

direct connection is established between one or more hosts. When multiple hosts are used
“swarming” is perform. Swarming is a technique which breaks down a target file into fragments
and several hosts upload different fragments to the requesting servent. When all of the fragments
have been transferred, the downloading computer combines each fragment into a single file and
validates it. Validation takes place on two occasions: before any file transfers take place when
several hosts are used to transfer one file and when the transfer is complete. Hash functions are
used in this form of validation by comparing hash values on each file host that is used for a
transfer and then to compare the transmitted file with the one from the source.
With the use of a bootstrap server to distribute servents lists, Gnutella seems to have a
centralized server. On the contrary, this bootstrap server can easily be removed without
jeopardizing the connectivity of the network’s active nodes since its protocol allows for users to
specify which servents to connect to. Therefore, as long as there are at least two servents
connected, a Gnutella network will exist. This takes away the dependency on a single computer
to always be connected like Napster and other centralized networks.
The main drawback to the Gnutella network is the speed for queries. Propagation of the
network can take large amounts of time for a single query to reach the specified search depth of
the system. Furthermore, the direct connections that are created from these queries take
additional time and slow the rate for a query result to be returned. To handle this rate issue
Gnutella 2 was created in 2002. Going on the fact that centralized servers tend to perform queries
more efficiently than their decentralized cousins, the developers of Gnutella 2 incorporated a
design with qualities from both architecture.
Gnutella 2 breaks away from the use of servents and separates peers by assigning “leaf”
and “hub” roles. Leaves are peers who initiate connections to one or two hubs at any given time.
10

A hub is a peer who accepts large amounts of leaf connections, collect file listings from all
connected leaves, and performs file searches for queries. This method takes away from the
network congestion the first generation of Gnutella has caused while guaranteeing that any file
on the network is reachable. Gnutella 2 also incorporates a few notable additions such as data
compression, the use of UDP, and a file preview function.
To decrease the bandwidth used for file transfers, the second generation of Gnutella uses
a compression scheme to attempt to minimize the file size for transmission. With compression,
faster transfers can take place creating more sources for shared files. Finally, a preview function
was added to this version of Gnutella. The preview of audio and video allows users to test a file
before a transfer is complete. File preview combats time wasting by the downloading peer for
receiving preview-able dummy files. In addition to this, file ratings have been installed which
allow users to comment on a transferred file. Ratings help notify future downloading nodes if a
file is corrupt, malware, poor quality, etc. New updates are constantly being made to the Gnutella
network to improve performance and security. These two early generations provided a
foundation for decentralized file-sharing.

2.3.2 KaZaa and FastTrack:
KaZaa is another P2P file sharing network that became popular with the downfall of
Napster. The KaZaa software uses the FastTrack file-sharing protocol to connect thousands of
computers to its single network. The FastTrack architecture can be seen as an extension to the
Gnutella protocol since it takes Gnutella’s basics fundamentals and produces a product whose
design is very similar to Gnutella 2.
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Instead of labeling peers as Gnutella’s “hubs” and “leaves”, FastTrack assigns “node”
and “supernode” roles to its incoming connections [4]. In much respects, supernodes perform the
same tasks as hubs and the same goes for nodes and leaves. Throughout the KaZaa network there
are many supernodes who each accept many connections from nodes. A computer connecting to
the network is given supernode status if and only if it is a fast computer with excellent bandwidth
and a fast connection. This selected few handles message passing between nodes which include
chat messages, query requests, and other network commands.
Each KaZaa application comes with a list of supernodes pre-installed. When a computer
wishes to join the network it will go through the list until a connection can be made to a
supernode. The incoming computer will then be given a list of supernodes to be used the next
time the computer wishes to enter the network and to select which supernode the incoming
computer wishes to use as its designated supernode for the current session. Once a supernode is
chosen, a connection is made and the incoming node will transmit a list of files it will share. If
the incoming computer is a supernode then it will connect to several other supernodes, broadcast
its supernode status, and await nodes to establish a connection to it.
When a user initiates a file search query, a message containing the search string is sent to
a supernode. The supernode will search through its listing of all files shared by the nodes it
oversees and reply with any matches. The supernode will also forward the query message to
other supernodes to broaden the search. When a file is located, a direct connection to the node
who initiated the query is established if one does not already exist. Once the connection is made,
the file information and the IP address of the file host are sent to the query author. When the
query author wants to download a file, a direct connection is made between it and the file hosts,
resulting in the file being fragmented among hosts and transmitted.
12

One interesting addition KaZaa brought to the file-sharing development community is the
use of “participation level”. The amount of bytes uploaded by a peer determines how many query
results will be returned to it and the downloading priority level it will possess. The use of the
participation level was implemented to thwart peers from only downloading and never sharing
(uploading) any files on the network.

2.3.2 BitTorrent:
BitTorrent [6] can be classified as thousands of directly connected node groups, each
sharing short-lived and sharing commonly interested files. In the most basic of BitTorrent
implementations, there is an absence of a centralized server to initialize connections or to process
queries. To handle file requests, a .torrent file is used which contains the IP address of the file’s
tracker server and information about the targeted file. File information would include the file
name, file offset and length, and hashes for each portion of the fragmented file. The tracker
server is a computer who maintains a list of other computers who posses some percentage of the
requesting file. When the requesting computer connects to the tracker, the list of uploaders will
be transmitted along with which portions they have. A connection is made to all or a subset of
the uploaders and specified blocks are transmitted to the requesting computer. The tracker is
constantly updated with the state of sharing nodes and which file fragments they share.
To initiate any BitTorrent file transfer, the .torrent file must be located. Torrent files can
be placed on websites, bulletin boards, newsgroups, etc to point potential downloaders to where
that the file is available. This .torrent file is created when a user wishes to share a file. It acts like
an announcement that the file is available. Once a user downloads a .torrent file and opens it in a
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BitTorrent client application, it will connect to the tracker specified and begin the process of
locating uploaders to begin the download. All users are given the option of running their own
tracker server to their shared files. This makes BitTorrent act as a large number of small filesharing networks.
The most interesting feature of BitTorrent is its method for increasing the availability of a
file. When a user has downloaded a portion of a file, immediately that portion can be shared to
other users. This increases the number of hosts and speed of transfers since files are being
downloaded from several sources. To guarantee that correct blocks are being transferred, the
hash values from the shared file are used to compare the portions to be transmitted. If the hash
values are not the same, a transfer will not occur, saving the downloader the time of downloading
a corrupt or wrong block and an uploader from having to waste bandwidth.
Another key feature BitTorrent has is its ability to not clog the network when a rare file is
being requested by a lot of users. When a bottleneck forms in a P2P system, a lot of strain can be
placed on a single sharer. BitTorrent handles this problem by uploading different blocks of a file
to different users when a file is rare. When several blocks are spread out among users, requesting
users can download missing blocks from other users, not burdening one computer with many
requests. This scheme, with the addition of downloading blocks out of order, speeds up file
transfers of rare files which seems to be a problem with other P2P systems.
The advantage for Bit Torrent is its handling of rare files and its use of swarming. Also,
the protocol uses a participation monitor that depends on how much a user has uploaded. If there
are multiple users requesting a file, priority will be given to those who have higher participation
levels, resulting in slow downloads for those who do not share.

14

2.4 Classification Summary:
In short, the most influential P2P protocols all differ in one significant way or another.
Napster was a centralized file-sharing system who supported fast queries but lacked the notion of
using several hosts to download a single file and fault tolerance. The first generation of Gnutella
created a unique way of connecting thousands of computers without the need of a centralized
server and implemented one of the first mainstream uses of swarming. Gnutella 2 was an
evolution of the first generation that went toward a more centralized approach by introducing the
assignment of hub and leaf roles to its peers but produced faster query results than its
predecessor. KaZaa has many similarities to Gnutella 2. Using the FastTrack protocol, Kazaa
does not need a centralized server due to its dependence on supernode listings to always be
updated. BitTorrent is a protocol that differs immensely from the other P2P systems mentioned.
Instead of creating one massive network of peers, BitTorrent thrives on the creation of .torrent
files to create very small computer groups where all connected users share an interest in the same
file. BitTorrent’s handling of rare files is unlike other file-sharing schemes due to its handling of
scarce fragments.

15

CHAPTER THREE: COMMON P2P SECURITY ISSUES
With the popularity of many commercial P2P file sharing applications, such as Napster
and Kazaa, security has become an aspect of P2P development that has begun to receive a lot of
attention. Until recently, security has not been a main focus for many P2P development schemes.
Alternatively, query speed and fault tolerance approaches monopolized system design in hopes
to be a beneficial tradeoff from secure systems. With in the last few years, P2P schemes, such as
Indra [13] have placed major emphasis on security for distributed environments. In this section,
the major security issues P2P systems face will be discussed.

3.1 Validity of Queried Files:
One security feature file sharing systems must incorporate is a strong mechanism to allow
users to verify the files to be downloaded are the intended files from their initial query. The need
for this feature is that most of the popular file-sharing applications suffer from dummy files
being introduced to their shared file libraries. These dummy files are files malicious users share
on the network in hopes of tricking an unsuspecting user to download them. At first glance, these
files seem to be the exact files querying users are looking for since they may have file lengths
that seem appropriate, IDE tags that match queried music or movie information, or in the most
basic of cases, have what seems to be a valid file name. Once a dummy file transfer is complete
and the user realizes the file is not the desired one, time, bandwidth, and possibly money is
wasted.
Several preexisting file sharing programs use file previewing to combat this issue.
Software like LimeWire and Morpheus allow their users to preview partially downloaded files
16

during the file transfer. For example, if an mp3 file is being downloaded and 1 megabyte (MB)
of the total 3 MB has been transferred, the user can preview the 1MB of audio to determine if the
transfer should continue or to kill the download. Although beneficial for downloaders, this
approach does not remedy the problem of dummy, corrupt, or undesired file transfers entirely.
One problem with this form of previewing approach is that some file formats, such as DivX
video [7], cannot be previewed until the entire file has been downloaded. In many cases, large
portions of the file must be downloaded in order to preview. By the time a user is able to use the
preview function, large amounts of time has passed and large amounts of data have been
transferred. A second problem occurs when dummy files contain looped versions of the queried
audio or video. The problem here lies when the user previews the transferred portion of the file
and does not detect the loop. The file could continue to be allowed to be transferred so when the
download is complete, the user is left with a dummy file. Once again, time and bandwidth,
among other things, are wasted.
Other existing solutions to dummy files are the employment of peer and file reviews.
Peer reviews allow users of P2P systems to rate each other on the quality of the files they share
and transfer. Once a file has been transferred, the downloader can evaluate the newly acquired
file and write a review (normally a rating 1-5) about the uploader and send it to the host or
servent computer for storage. A similar manner was used for file reviews, where the reviews of
the files were sent to the hosts and also stored on the downloader’s computer. These
rating/review systems allowed users to use the opinions of others before downloading a file by
retrieving reviews when query results are returned, making these P2P systems integrity based.
A few problems arise from this solution. The first problem is the mandatory storage of
addition information. Each review must be stored on some computer for easy retrieval. If the
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hosts involved were Gnutella servents and could disconnect from the system at any point, backup
methods would have to be employed to guarantee the reviews and ratings were long-lived. A
second problem is that these reviews and ratings were more data being returned during queries.
This ultimately would slow down query results from being returned to the users, hurting one of
the most important goals of any P2P file system (fast query results). In addition, these integrity
based systems must deal with malicious users. This opens the risk of users returning false ratings
or biased reviews in hopes of discrediting or promoting a user or a file.

3.2 Verifying Transferred Files:
Another security issue that file sharing systems must handle is to verify that a
downloaded file is an exact copy of the file selected to download from the initial query results.
One cause of this problem is the ability of uploaders to modify the file contents of files to be
uploaded while the files are being transferred. This problem occurs when file sharing programs
allow users to pause or temporarily suspend transfers.
One solution is to use hash values of files before and after every file transfer. A hash
function, using the files to be transferred as input, is used to generate these hash values. Once a
file has been transferred, the downloader can take the hash value of the downloaded file and
compare it to the hash value of the file stored on the uploader’s computer. One common issue
with file verification using hash values is when transfer pausing is allowed. Here, the uploader
must send the hash value of file content that was transmitted to the downloader for verification.
If the hash values differ, then the downloader should reject that uploader as a host.
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A second use of hash functions in file sharing applications is when a user can download a
single file from multiple sources. In this use, hash values of returned files from queries can be
compared to determine if multiple sources of the same file exist.
Cryptographic hash functions, like the MD5 algorithm, with a 128-bit hash value, are
widely used for file verification [21]. The popular P2P application eDonkey uses the MD4
algorithm in its early versions to verify file partitions[15].

3.3 Malicious Users:
The very real possibility of individuals and groups of individuals attempting to harm a
P2P system poses a real threat to the health, existence, and security of any P2P community as
evident in [28]. Since the very base of P2P per networks are their peers, attacks can originate
from anywhere within the network. Attack motives include but are not limited to clogging the
system, obtaining IP lists of users, using the systems resources, spread spam messages, and infect
users with worms, viruses, trojans, spyware, and other forms of malware [27].
One method previously discussed involved poisoning attacks, which are when malicious
users share dummy files which differ from their descriptions [22]. This attack’s main purpose is
to dupe users into wasting time and bandwidth. More sinister poisoning attacks include dummy
files with malware. With the spread of viruses in a file sharing system, sections of a P2P network
can easily be disabled from attack, resulting in computer damage at individual nodes,
unavailability of rare or precious files, and in systems with the group hierarchies, difficulty for
groups to thrive [27].
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Current solutions to malware attacks involve the users making file reviews, scanning files
with anti-virus software, and using intrusion detection systems (IDS) such as NetBiotic [27] to
detect malicious activity. Schemes like NetBiotic allow malware to be detected at local levels
and then broadcast alerts other connected computers about the threat. Depending on the severity
of the threat, IDS’s can choose what actions need to take place in order to neutralize the attack.
Other IDSs will be discussed later to handle other forms of attacks.
Two other attacks P2P systems must be prepared for are Denial of Service (DOS) and
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks [27]. DOS attacks are when malicious users send
large number of packets of data to a computer with the intent to slow the computer down, or in
extreme cases, knock the victim computer offline [28]. In coordinated attacks, DDOS attacks
involve multiple computers attacking a computer system. In P2P systems, servents-like nodes or
hosts are the more vulnerable computers to these attacks. If a host is victim to a DOS or DDOS
attack, all of its connected users can suffer from slow query responses, not be able to query the
adequate portions of the network, and may lose the ability to connect to peers outside of its group
or neighbors. If a host is disconnected from a DOS attack, all of its clients must connect to
another host to interact with the system. The coordination of DDOS attacks does not require all
of the attackers to be malicious. A prime example of this involves DDOS originated by one
computer that trick non-malicious users into sending a targeted computer data or requests for
data by falsifying query results [32].
An attack related to DOS attacks is flooding. Flooding is an attack that consists of
malicious users who are connected to the system sending large amounts of queries and other
system commands throughout the network. In many cases, theses attacks send a flood of
messages to a node with the intention to do the same damage as a typical DOS attack. In some
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regards, flooding can cause more problems than DOS attacks, depending on the architecture of
the network. For example, if queries are forwarded from servent to servent, as in Gnutella, each
visited servent can see the same attack as the original servent. To combat this possible
vulnerability, checks must be made to guarantee that each node is not allowed to send a large
enough amount of commands, queries, or data in a given time to potentially harm the system.
Also, during direct connections, peer applications should also limit the amount of
communication being transmitted between peers for a given interval as an extra precaution.
IP harvesting is another security threat that must be attended to for P2P systems. IP
harvesting is the gathering of user IP addresses with the intent to either perform some form of
computer attack or to use the address to trace the personal identity of peer [32]. With an IP
address, a users’ name, phone number, and address can be obtained if divulged by an ISP. This
information can be obtained by groups like the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) with court orders or the threat of
suing an ISP’s over copyright violations. These groups constantly search file sharing networks
for copyright law violators and in many cases, take legal action. In order to guarantee user
privacy, protocols like Friend-to-Friend (F2F) and anonymous P2P systems have been created.
F2F systems are P2P networks that base connections on trusted peers and strong levels of
encryption. Here, peers who know each other (“friends”) can only share communication and data
with each other, friends of friends, friends of friends of friends, etc. Users of F2F networks can
only share data with people in a web-of-trust, where every member can be traced to a direct
friend. The most popular of F2F systems is WASTE, which was developed at NULLSOFT in
2003 by Justin Frankel [29].
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Anonymous P2P protocols attempt to hide node identities behind a cloud of deniability
[5]. This way, it is difficult to locate the original source of any request on the system. There are
several anonymous P2P protocols in existence; among the most popular are Freenet [5] and the
BitTorrent client Azureus [1].

3.4 Intrusion Detection:

In P2P systems, the act of intrusion can occur in a lot of different places. Two of most
important areas of intrusion are at the network level and at system privileges. At the network
level, intrusion is present when unauthorized persons attempt to gain access to the system [13].
This includes being able to connect to peers, make queries, and perform other system features
authorize peers are capable to perform. An example would be of malicious users attempting to
gain access to a password protected system with authorization. In P2P systems that allow users to
set privileges on network items, such as files, groups, bandwidth speeds, and peercommunication, potential intrusion needs to be anticipated.
The occurrence of users that successfully access features that they do not have authorized
privileges for is a major security problem since it threatens confidentiality of peers and reliability
of the system. The need of intrusion detection mechanisms is essential for any secure P2P
system. Many existing intrusion detection and prevention schemes, like Indra [13], target passive
and aggressive attacks that try to break in or disrupt a network. Such schemes attempt to
recognize common areas of attack, such as port scanning, multiple failed logins, and possible
DOS and DDOS attacks. Similar to how NetBiotic [27] forwards warning messages from nodes
that were victims of attack to other nodes on the network, “neighborhood watch” and P2P
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communication has become a good mechanism for detecting intrusion attempts and preventing
the spread [13].
Sybil attacks are a security issue that many P2P networks must address. Sybil attacks
mostly target the reputation systems of networks that employ such a scheme by attempting to
make them meaningless. This form of attack occurs when users are permitted to create multiple
identities on a network. With these multiple identities, users can perform malicious tasks on
some of their identities and behave correctly on others. This allows malicious users to always
have access to the privileges that well behaved nodes have and disrupt the network at the same
time [8]. As one can imagine, this is a problem for reputation schemes attempting to punish
malicious nodes and phrase behaving ones.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RELATED WORK

Indra [13] is an intrusion detection and prevention scheme that is based on the P2P
architecture. It is powerful in the fact that once there is an attack at a single node level, messages
are sent out through the network, notifying other nodes of the attack. The protection starts with
each host on the network running the Indra daemon. The daemon watches for common intrusion
attempts and ones based on previous attempts. Since hosts rely on the validity of security
messages, a Web of Trust is used, where all nodes are connected by trust relationships. This
assists in preventing nodes from reporting false intrusion attempts and disrupting the system. In
addition, efficient group communication is essential for the distribution of intrusion information.
The efficient group communication helps guarantee that messages are sent and received. The
basic architecture of Indra depends on four separate roles: Watchers, Access Controllers,
Listeners, and Reporters. Watchers look for suspicious activity, either locally or over the
network. Access Controllers provide controlled access to the resources. Listeners listen to the
watchers and transmit warnings to the Access Controllers. Reporters communicate with other
hosts by receiving and forwarding warnings on intrusion attempts. A few of the common
intrusion threats Indra monitors for include multiple failed logins, port scan attempts, and
suspicious system calls [13].
Vlachos et al’s NetBiotic [27] is an application that uses a collection of several computers
in a group of peers to exchange messages with information about attacks. The difference
between NetBiotic and Indra is that the former takes into account more local attacks, such as
viruses, and determines how to handle to threat across the network. The NetBiotic application
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has two roles: Notifiers and Handlers. Notifiers are daemons responsible for monitoring the local
node on which it is running to gather information on possible security attacks. This daemon
monitors security applications like firewalls, anti-virus software, and IDS’s for suspicious events.
Handlers are the NetBiotic daemon that receives messages sent from the Notifiers of other nodes
and performs actions based on those messages to protect that node and the network [27].
Another category of secure P2P systems attempt to guarantee the anonymity of all users
at the cost of increased bandwidth and query speeds. One such system is Freenet [5]. Freenet is
decentralized data store which heavily relies on its key-based routing system to protect queries
and file retrieval. In essence, Freenet is a network of nodes communicating with one another
through the use of encrypted messages. In this system, no broadcast searches or centralized
servers every have to be used to relay data. Similar to the Gnutella protocol, Freenet nodes
connect to several other nodes running the Freenet protocol to establish a network of neighbors.
When a node wishes to query for a file, encrypted messages, containing the key of the target file,
are passed from neighbor to neighbor. When a neighbor receives a query command, it will search
its local data store to detect if portions of the file are stored locally or if the location is known on
the network, and return the results to the neighbor who passed the query message. If the location
is unknown at an individual node level, the query message is passed to the neighbors of the
current node. If the file location is not known after reaching a predefined search depth, messages
are returned in reverse order, notifying neighbors a search branch has not located the file. The
use of relaying messages from node to node guarantees the anonymity of the query author. The
guarantee is made since nodes can always claim to be relaying another node’s query. To further
guarantee the anonymity of users, especially producers and consumers of the files being shared,
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Freenet encrypts and fragments shared files, to distribute the content across the network. The
distribution of encrypted file fragments prevent nodes from knowing what files they are sharing
but the key-based routing system allows querying nodes to locate desired files. The goal here is
that even if a consumer knows the identity of the producer, the producer cannot be held
accountable for the file transmission since it cannot have any idea of what file it is sharing.
Another anonymous P2P system is GNUnet [11]. Similar to Freenet, it also is decentralized and
claims to be censorship-resistant.
Another genre of secure P2P networks uses the Friend-to-Friend (F2F) approach to
protect users. The main idea of F2F networks is that nodes only connect to nodes either they can
trust or to nodes a friend of someone in a friend-of-a-friend web can trust. Basically, files are
only shared and queries are only made within a web-of-trust where each node can be traced to
another node through friends associations. There are two major disadvantages arise in F2F
networks. One, the existence of malicious friendly nodes can completely disrupt a F2F network.
Two, files outside of the friend web are unreachable. The most well known F2F network is
WASTE [29].
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CHAPTER FIVE: SARP NET
SARP Net is a P2P overlay network that is designed to protect the activity of its users. It
is secure in the fact that public-key encryption is used to guard network messages from prying
eyes internal and external of the network. The protocol guarantees user anonymity by
incorporating message-hopping from node to node to prevent any network observer from
pinpointing the origin of any query or shared-file source. To further enhance the system’s
security, a reputation scheme is incorporated to police nodes from malicious activity, maintain
the overlay’s topology, and enforce rules to protect node identity. The following sections
describe in detail the design of SARP Net.

5.1 Topology:
SARP Net is based on a three tier hierarchy where each level denotes a unique role to the
system. Each role is used to maintain the formation of node groups to process queries, file
transfers, and distribute reputations.

5.1.1 Node Roles:
User-node: The bottom tier is comprised of user-nodes. User-nodes are the most basic type of
node in the topology, being the most common role throughout the network. This type of user has
the privileges making, responding to and forwarding queries, query and return interaction
receipts, transfer files, and post reputations based on interactions of other connected nodes. Usernodes cannot establish connections to other nodes outside of their group for any reason than to
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process file transfers. Connections to all or a subset of nodes within the same group are permitted
to exchange messages directly. Even though the user-node role is the lowest leveled, user-nodes
are the driving force of each group since they produce the most queries, query responses, file
transfers, and reputations.

Group-Leaders: The middle tiered role is that of group-leaders. Group-leaders represent the
current hosts for a group of which user-nodes connect to in order to join the network. In effect,
group-leaders connect each group member to other groups by establishing links to leader-ofleader nodes. Nodes of this role govern the group by monitoring the activities of their user-nodes
by making judgment based on reputation and alert messages from nodes internal and external to
the group. If a user-node is determined to be malicious, the set of group-leaders have the
privilege of isolating a node from the group or restrict the node’s privileges to make the group
safe. Group-leaders divide their resources (bandwidth and processing power) between providing
the services user-nodes offer, forwarding interaction receipts, resolving interaction disputes,
validating incoming users, and maintaining the formation of the group. A user-node has the
opportunity to be promoted to group-leader if the user-node excels more than the other usernodes when an appointment of a new group-leader is needed. Role promotion and demotion will
be discussed later.

Group: A group is not a role a node can obtain but can be seen as a virtual container for usernodes and group-nodes who are connected by references and associations. Each group is made
up of a number of user-nodes and a fraction of as many group-leaders to govern them. The
number of group-leaders is proportional to the number of user-nodes currently online. For
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example, a group rule can be set for every 10 user-nodes one group-leader is assigned. Groupleaders of a group are interconnected to allow free flowing messages to be exchanged. Groupleaders of a group must share the same group-state and update other group-leaders if a state is
altered. The establishment of groups allows subsets of nodes in the network to be governed:
punishing malicious nodes, rewarding benevolent nodes, maintain the livelihood of a group,
keeping group-members updated, accepting new members from node references, and verifying
member identity when existing members join the network.

Leader-of-Leader: The top tier of the hierarchy is the leader-of-leader (LL) role. LL’s connect
groups to other groups by acting as a go-between by forwarding messages from one group’s
group-leader to a different group’s group-leader. The role of LL has two major jobs: forward
messages from one group to all of the other connected groups and to punish groups who
repeatedly allow their malicious user-nodes to hurt the integrity of the system. LL’s act very
similar to group-leaders except they are responsible for group-leader behavior. The activities of
LL’s are checked by other LL’s of the same leader-group and group-leaders in their range of
connection. LL’s are promoted from the group-leaders who have fast connections, display superb
reputation ratings, and have managed their groups properly. LL’s divide their resources by
forwarding message between groups and other LL’s and monitoring group behavior.

Leader-Group: Leader-groups differ from groups of user-nodes and group-leaders by being
comprised of LL’s. Each leader-group has a proportion of LL’s to groups. For example, if there
is a 10:1 ratio of LL’s to groups of a leader-group of 30 groups, three LL’s will be
interconnected to manage the groups. Each leader-group is connected to other leader-groups by
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the connections their LL’s establish. Since it is not feasible for each leader-group to be connected
to all leader-groups in the network, a leader-group is connected to a subset of other leadergroups. With this setup, each LL of a leader-group is connected to the same leaders of other
leader-groups.

Bootstrap Server (optional): A bootstrap server is proposed to act as a reference for nodes that
do not have another entry point into the network. The bootstrap server maintains information on
each group and IP addresses and port of online LL’s and group-leaders. When a group is formed,
its identification is sent to the bootstrap server as well as the group’s public-private key pair.
This key pair is used to verify that user querying for an IP of a group-leader is an actual member.
When the query is made, the incoming user must send a message using the group’s private key.
The bootstrap server will then authenticate the message with the group’s public. If the message is
valid, the server will transmit the IP and port numbers of the group’s online group-leaders.
Needless to say, each member of a group must have the group’s key pair in order to join the
group. Without the key pair, the user cannot access online group-leader information and cannot
enter the network from that entry point.

To maintain the state of the network, each group-leader and leader-of-leader is required
to constantly update the bootstrap server with status reports of the system. The status messages
must include IP addresses and ports of online group-leaders and LL’s, number of connected
users and their roles.
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Bootstrap servers have the privilege of pruning the network of malicious nodes and
reassign roles. For example, if a LL is not taking action on a group who repeatedly is being
reported malicious, the bootstrap server can tell the surrounding LL’s of the malicious LL to
either demote or boot the malicious LL from the leader-group. More details about network
safeguarding are described later.

Figure 3: SARP Net’s Node Roles
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5.1.2 Group Formation:
With or without a bootstrap server, the network can allow for the creation of groups.
When a connected user wishes to establish a group, a group creation request command is sent to
the closest LL overseeing that section of the network. The command contains the future group’s
name, the group identification where the creator currently has membership to, the creator’s
username, and the future group’s public key. The LL will then perform a query to retrieve the
creator’s group reputation and find out how many groups were created by members of this group
in the past. If the creator’s group is highly reputable and has a free group creation, then the future
group’s information will be shared among all of the connected LL’s. When the group’s creator
wishes to invite a new user to join the group, the new user will be given the group’s private and
public keys to verify the user belongs to the group. If a bootstrap server is used, the new group’s
information and public key will be transmitted to the bootstrap server directly from the creator.

When a node wishes to locate fellow group-members through another node, a query can
be sent containing a group search message encrypted in group’s private key. Eventually a node
with the group’s public key will receive the message, most likely a LL, and retrieve the location
of one of the group’s active group leaders. The query will then be replied along the same path to
the verified incoming group-member. If a group-member joins the network but is the only active
one, the closest LL will recognize that group-member to be the sole active group leader and will
redirect any future group inquiries to that active member.
When a new joins the group or when a group-leader is lost, group-leaders must make
decisions on who to promote based on reputation, available bandwidth, and processing power.
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Simple “ping” message can be used to gauge bandwidth and processing power to determine
which user-node should be promoted.
Once a new group-leader is assigned, the other group- leaders will update the promoted
node’s status by transmitting reputations, collected query data, and group status information. In
addition the group-leader will establish connections to all of the group-members it is responsible
for. The number of group-leader to user-node coverage is based on the group’s configuration
where some groups may want all of their group-leaders to be connected to all of the members or
have each group leader be in charge of a section of the group. Groups that allow group-leaders to
connect to all group members allow each group-leader to act as a backup where if one groupleader is busy, another group leader is easily accessible to provide the same service. Also,
messages can be verified easier with majority voting if repetitive messages are transmitted from
one group member to all of the group-leaders. Groups that divide the group responsibilities
decrease the workload placed on each group-leader and allow these nodes to focus serving a
subset of the group.
Finally, the new group-leader will connect to the assigned LL’s to allow the group to
communicate with other groups. Once the new group-leader is updated, that node can be used to
help the group process network requests and traffic.
Leader-of-Leaders are assigned in a similar manner as the group-leaders. Based on the
system configuration, the ratio of LL’s to groups should be adequate enough for each leader-ofleader to process network messages without creating a bottleneck or slow network performance.
The performance of LL’s is vital to the health of the system since they provide the link that
connect groups together and manages the communication between different sections of the
network. With this reason, LL’s should be the most reliable computers on the network. Keeping
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in mind that LL’s are still nodes with the capability of becoming malicious, disconnect without
warning, and suddenly experience poor performance bandwidth or CPU processing, safeguards
must be incorporated. These provisions should gracefully handle the possibility of several LL’s
failing at a given time to prevent network paralysis. The most important LL criteria must be that
the most reputable nodes with the fastest available bandwidth and CPU processing should be
permitted to occupy the highest tiered role in the system.
When a group comes online for the first time, a leader-group will be assigned to it. This
normally means the leader-group that receives the sole group-member will be the leader-group
that will service it. If a LL disconnects, the LL’s of that leader-group will promote the most
outstanding group-leader or user-node. By promoting user-nodes to LL’s, group restructuring is
minimized. On the other hand, promoting group-leaders to LL’s allow for faster node
comparisons at the cost of forcing the chosen group-leader’s group to restructure to find a
replacement group-leader. It is vital for each LL of a leader-group to be connected to all of the
same group leaders and LL’s of other leader-groups. This requirement is for the stability of the
network and the ability of LL’s to reliably take part in the reputation scheme.
Leader-groups may be disbanded when the number of groups serviced by a leader-group
becomes small. In this case, the leader-groups will pass on the responsibility of serving its
groups to other leader groups. This should increase the number of potential query hits since
groups are guaranteed to interact with more groups and their members.
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Figure 4: The SARP Net Topology

5.1.3 Node Limitations:
To set bounds on the amount of groups the system can have or the amount of
untrustworthy nodes can join the network there are a number of limitations that are applied to all
participants in the network. The first limitation is how many people a node can invite to a group.
This limitation is monitored by the group-leaders but is stored by all of the group-members or on
the group’s dedicated server that can also act as a key distributor. For example, each groupmember is given 1 invitation after being logged into the system for a total of 50 days, has shared
or helped forward over 2 gigabytes of data, and has a high enough positive reputation. With this
invitation, the group member can invite anyone to join the group and give that new member the
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group’s private key. With this invitation and reference from the group-member, the new member
can connect to any active node in the system, be redirected to any of the target group’s groupleaders for username registration and key exchange. Once the invitation has been used, the
acknowledging group-leader will alert all of the group-leaders in the group who will help notify
all other group-members that the inviter has used his invitation. If the group has a dedicated
server established, this message can be sent to the server instead of having to be distributed to all
group-members
In order to limit users from flooding the network, several limitations are suggested.
Firstly, user-nodes should not be allowed to forward more than 2 queries per minute. Each
group-member should keep a log of all incoming messages dating back to 2 minutes. This log
will allow nodes to determine if any node is attempting to flood it or the network with queries. If
flooding is allowed, the entire system can suffer from slow processing and see the same effects
as DOS attacks. As detailed in the routing protocol, description message forwarding is an
integral part of the system. These forwarded messages can too act as a method of flooding the
system. To alleviate this potential threat of nodes attacking the network with a series of
inauthentic forwarding messages, nodes are expected to process incoming messages on a queue.
The message queue allows a node to manage messages and delay the forwarding request to
prevent strain on the node’s resources and the intended destination. Similar to query time
limiting, a node should not forward a high amount of messages to the same destination for a set
time. This limitation should be based on a node’s group status and amount of traffic taking place.
Certainly, the time restraint should not halt the querying process but it should be able to detect if
a node is attempting to flood the system with messages.
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5.2 Key Distribution:
Each node must store and transfer keys to keep the network secure. Several generated
keys are exchanged to protect from eavesdropping, user impersonation, transfer verification, and
forwarding receipts.
Upon group creation, the creator must generate a public-private key pair. The public key
is shared throughout the network as verification for when a user claims to belong to the group.
Each group member will sign a verification message in the group’s private key to prove that he
belongs to the group. A typical interaction would include a node A connecting to a LL B and
claiming to be a group member of group X. A will send B a time stamped message encrypted in
the group’s private key. B will look up group X’s public key to decrypt the message. If B can
successfully decrypt the message, B knows that A belongs to group X. Each node on the network
must store its group’s public-private key pair. Without the key pair, a group member cannot
connect and interact with its group.
All nodes must also contain their group identification key pair. Once a user is accepted as
group member, it must create the key pair and share its public key with members of the group.
This public key will be used for identification verification. After proving that the user belongs to
a group and establishes a connection to a group leader, the user must prove its identity. The
incoming user will transmit the username he claims to posses and a time stamped message with
the private key of the username. If the group leader can decrypt the message, the incoming user
can be accepted as the username provided. The group-member’s public key must be distributed
to all of the group-members to allow a member to join the active group regardless of which
group-members are serving as the group-leaders. This key pair provides a method of verifying
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users without running the risk of malicious users in the group of obtaining a fellow group
member’s password.
For each interaction between nodes, data must be encrypted in the source’s private key
then decrypted by the source’s public key once transmitted by the recipient. Interacting nodes
have the option of generating a session key that is established and generated once a connection is
made. Still, messages need to be signed in the source’s private key for interaction receipts.
To distribute keys, group creators can establish a long-lived server that acts as the
group’s centralized authority. This key distributor should store public keys for all groupmembers and the public-private key pair of the group. If each group establishes a key distributor
and broadcasts information to contact the server, then key distributors can take the place of the
typical central authority. The existence of group key distributors will make it easy to recover
from key compromises, broadcasts of group alerts, and key look-ups.

5.3 Routing Protocol:
The routing protocol of this network describes how nodes communicate with one another.
The passing of messages allow file queries and transfers, reputation look-ups and postings, and
network status updates to be processed securely throughout the system.

File Queries: File queries attempt to search the network for shared files that satisfy the criteria in
the query message. For example, if a node searched for “documentation P2P” query hits may
return information on files that have filenames that contain word “documentation” or “P2P”.
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Typically, group-leaders and user-nodes should only be allowed to make file queries. This is to
prevent any slow down and potential bottlenecks at the leader-of-leader level.
The routing of an initial file query message and a file query message to be forwarded are
handled in the same manner. If LL’s are given the privilege to start queries, and if a LL starts the
query, it will send the message to all of the groups it is in charge of by sending the message to
one of each of the connected group’s group-leaders. The LL will also send the message to all of
the LL’s it is connected to. If a LL receives a file query from a LL in the same leader group, it
will search for the file locally and not forward the message to anyone. If a LL receives the query
from a group-leader, it will forward the message to all other connected groups by sending the
message to one of each group’s group-leaders, forward the message to the other LL’s in its
leader-group, and finally send the message to one LL of each of the other leader groups it is
connected to. LL’s will only forward a query if the hops-to-live (HTL) value is currently greater
than zero. In SARP Net, HTL is used to maintain the scalability of file queries since it would be
impractical for file queries to be forced to propagate throughout the entire network, especially if
the network is large. The HTL value is decremented by 1 when a LL forwards the message. If a
group leader initializes or receives a file query from a user-node, it will send a message to all of
the group-members it is responsible for and one of its LL’s. If the group-leader received the file
query from any of its fellow group-leaders, it will perform the search for the file locally and
forward the message to the fraction of user-nodes it is responsible for forwarding messages to.
User-nodes handle file queries differently than the leaders. A user-node who initializes a
query sends the message to either another user-node in the same group or to one of the groupleaders based on a set forward probability. If this probability is 50%, the user-node will send the
message to another user-node 50% of the time; the other 50% of the time the message will be
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forwarded to a group-leader. When another user-node receives a file query from user-node it
must forward the message to a third user-node or one of the group-leaders, again based on the
forward probability. If a user-node received the same query twice from a user-node, it will
forward the query to a group-leader.
A potential attack would be for user-nodes to forward a file query from a group-leader to
other user-nodes so when a user-node receives the forwarded message it will forward it to other
nodes. This would attempt to slow the system by occupying it with redundant forwards. One
solution to this is that if a user-node receives 2 messages of the same query, one from the groupleader and one from a user-node, that user-node knows a user-node in the forward chain is
misbehaving and should refuse to forward the message again.
All messages are encrypted in the private key of the source node (node A). Let node B
represent the file query’s destination. The following messages are the text that is encrypted in the
source’s private key. Below is the message for a file query being transmitted from A to B:

EPrA(“FQ” || TS || QID || HTL || FIDA || message)
The contents encapsulated by EPrA are encrypted in A’s private key. “FQ” is the message
keyword notifying the destination that this message is a file query. The symbol || represents
string concatenation. TS is the date and time stamp the query was made. QID is the query
identification number. This identification is generated by the query source and should be unique
to all file queries spawned from the source node. HTL is the remaining hops-to-live for the
query. By default, HTL should be set to a value between 4 and 6, depending on the size of the
network. If the destination node B is a LL and forwards the message, the forwarded message’s
HTL should be decremented by 1. FIDA is forward identification number generated by the node
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that is sending the file query to a destination. This FID should be uniquely generated and should
be different than the QID. It represents the identification number used by each node to provide
proof that the node forwarded the message to another node. Valid FID’s should comprise of a
hash of the username and some number that is unique to all forward messages a node will
experience during an active session. The label “message” is the file search criteria each user will
use to find files to satisfy the query.

Query Hits: Once a node receives a file query message, it will search its local machine for a file
that meets the search’s criteria and if a match is found, a query hit message is generated. Query
hits traverse the reverse path of the query once returned to a group-leader. Each node uses the
query table to know who to forward a query hit to in order for the response to reach the query
author. This query table is a history of all interaction receipts for incoming file queries and is
stored locally. For example, if a user-node is the source (node A) and a query hit is found at
another user-node in a different group (node B), B will send the hit message to either its group
leader or another user-node in the group (based on the forward probability discussed earlier).
Eventually the group-leader will receive the message and forward it to the LL who sent the query
to the group. The LL will forward the hit to the source’s group, and the group-leader who
receives the hit will send the message to all of its fellow group-leaders. The group-leader who
received the file query from the user-node will forward the message to that query source. The hit
will traverse the user-nodes of the query’s source until the source finally receives the message.
At this point, the query author should forward the hit to a random group-member to create
deniability. Again, let node A be the query author, let node B be the node forwarding the hit to
A. If node A forwards the hit to another node (C), B cannot determine if A is the query author.
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The forwarding should continue until a node has received the message twice or the forwarding
probability has not been satisfied.

EPrB(“QH”|| QID|| HIDB || FIDB || GroupIDB || IP:PortMM || TS || File Info)
Above is the initial file hit the hit source will send transmit. PrB is the private key of the
hit’s source, Node B. The text encompassed by EPrB is encrypted using the private key of B.
“QH” lets the message destination (the node receive this message next) knows that this message
is a query hit. QID is the query ID this hit message is replying to. HIDB is the hit ID which
should be unique to all other hits to this query generated from this node to this query ID. FIDB is
the forward ID used to monitor nodes forwarding habits. GroupIDB is the group ID of group
where the hit source resides in. This ID is used to identify where query hits and file transfers are
coming from. The GroupID is specified by one of the hit source’s group-leaders and is verified
by the LL. Upon initial query creation, the query author specifies the group ID. Following the
group ID is the IP and port of a middle-man that leads to the transfer of the requested file. This
IP address must belong to a group-member of the hit source’s group. It is important that middlemen are rotated to prevent any group-member overwhelmed by servicing too many file transfer
requests. Next is the time stamp of when the query message was generated, followed by the file
information containing the file name, file description, file offset and length, hash, and other vital
information in regard to the file.

File Requests: Once a query hit has been returned to the query source (node A), a file request
can be performed. To protect A’s identity, A has the option to connect to the middle-man directly
or ask another user-node in the group to connect on its behalf. If the request is forwarded to
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another group-member, that node has the option to connect to the middle-man directly or
forward the request again. Similar to forwarding file queries, this decision to connect to the
middle-man or forward the request is base on a forward probability. It is essential that the
number of forwards is low since long chains from a file query author to the hit author will create
noticeable delays in the file transfer. Once a node from A’s group connects to the middle-man of
B’s group specified in the hit message, the middle man will connect to a user-node in its group
(node C) and request the file. If C does not have the requested file in its shared files or cache, it
will forward the request to another group member who will perform the same recursive search.
When a node with the file receives the forwarded search message, it will forward the request just
like file queries and reply with the requested fragment of the file with a delay. The fragment is
transferred the reverse path back to A.

EPrA(“FR”|| FRID|| FIDA || IP:PortMM || TS || File Hash || File Offset|| File Length)
Above is the message for a file request. It represents the message transferred from A to
the next node in the path to B. “FR” represents that this message is a file request. FRID is the file
request identification used to distinguish file requests. FIDA is the forward ID used to make sure
nodes are forward the message. IP:PortMM is the IP and port number of the middle-man of the
file source’s group who is listening for incoming connections for file requests. TS is the time
stamp of the message initialization. File Hash is the hash of the requested file to be transmitted.
File offset is the beginning offset of the requested file’s segment. File length is the distances
from the offset to the requested file segment length.
It is important to note that the hit source’s identity is never truly known by the query’s
author. From this, nodes cannot rate individual node file transfers but can leave evaluations about
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interactions with other groups. The goal of this is to force groups to maintain a healthy level of
behavior and isolate malicious nodes.

Interaction Receipts: Interaction receipts are evidence that two nodes interacted. They are used
to provide nodes with proof of forwarding and receiving messages. Interaction receipts here are
very similar to the ones described in [25]. The receipts in SARP Net are the only pieces of
evidence a node can use to accuse another node of not forwarding messages or message
tampering. Each receipt is signed by the two interacting nodes’ private keys. For instance, if
node A sent node B a message, the message would contain text encrypted in A’s private key.
Once B receives the message, it will reply to A with the same message encrypted in B’s private
key along with other data. B will also forward the receipt to a third-party node that A can access.
If two user-nodes are interacting, the receipt will be sent to one of their group-leaders. If a usernode and group-leader interact, the receipt is forwarded to another group-leader. If another
group-leader is not available, the receipt will be sent to other user-nodes.
Node B will append to the reply receipt (the receipt from B to A) its next forward ID. The
forward ID is a number that represents the identifier B will use to forward another node the
original message. For example, if B forwards the message to C, that message will have B’s
forward ID. Since the reply receipt has the forward ID from B to C, node A can query a node that
is visible to itself for the forwarding receipt C generated after receiving the message from B.
With the reply receipt node C sends B, B can forward that reply receipt to A, so now A has proof
that B forwarded the message to some one. If a node does not receive a forwarding-receipt from
a node, that node can always query neighboring nodes for the receipt. If no receipt is received,
then a node knows either the non-forwarding node is either misbehaving, was providing message
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cover to protect a query author’s identity, or is the source of the file for file transfers. Since
nodes forward hit messages even if it is the query author, queries are difficult to track who is the
query author without mass collaboration. For file transfers, the failure to produce a receipt allows
groups to pinpoint which nodes are transmitting malware without knowing which filenames
produced the query response and divulging information about what files nodes are downloading
and which files nodes are sharing.

Reputation Messages: Reputation messages are what distribute node ratings across the network.
Once a node rates another group, it must distribute the message so it will propagate throughout
the network, spreading that node’s opinion about the group being rated. The fastest and most
common way for a node to alert other groups about a particular group’s behavior is from file
transfers. Once a file has been evaluated by a node, that node will send a reputation message
along the same path as the file transfer traversed, from the rating node, through intermediate
nodes in the same group (if any), to the middle-man, through intermediate nodes of the file
source’s group (if any), to eventually the file source. The first node along that chain that cannot
produce a receipt saying that it received the file fragment from someone else will be determined
the file source. The node that locates this file source will send a message to its group-leaders
with the interaction receipt that it received the file fragment from the file source along with the
reputation message coming from the node that made the query, also known as the file’s final
destination. Also, the file’s final destination node will spread the reputation to all of its group
members and to the group-leaders of the file source’s group to notify the group of the incident.
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Interaction and Reputation Queries: Interaction and reputation queries propagate differently.
Interaction queries are almost always needed for proof of interaction within the same leadergroup, meaning that the interaction is normally for someone governed by the same leader-ofleaders. With that said, these queries have a HTL is set to 1. If the receipt is needed for a node
outside of the leader-group, then the HTL can be increased. Reputation queries traverse the
network the same way as file queries. Its HTL should be higher than interaction queries in order
to poll a larger number of groups. Ideally, this HTL should be set between 4 and 6, depending on
the say of the network and the number of nodes.

5.4 Fragment Caching:
SARP Net incorporates caching of file fragments to increase transfer speeds. Each node
has the ability to set a cache limit which will store as much data as that limit allows of fragments
a node receives as an intermediate node or middle-man node during file transfer. Each cache
entry will have metadata that will contain information about how that node received the
fragment. This includes the interaction receipt and the fragment’s hash value. It should be noted
that only a file source can reply to a file query as a query hit. Cache hits should only take place
during file requests. If a file request comes in for a particular hash value, any node with that file
fragment can reply. This allows for swarming/multi-source file transfers from one group to
another. It is multi-sourced since when a file request is forwarded by a middle-man. Middle-men
randomly select nodes to forward requests to. If this is done for different file fragments that are
stored through out the group, an entire file’s fragments could all be transmitted to the middleman by different nodes.
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All reputation ratings are tied with the fragment’s original source. This makes it the sole
responsibility of nodes to share benevolent files. If a node possesses a malicious file fragment in
its cache, it should remove the fragment as soon as the reputation message is received. Violators
can be found with query probes by group-leaders to locate misbehaving nodes.
Cache entries should only contain the most requested fragments while respecting a set
time-to-live (TTL). A node should delete a fragment from cache when the fragment’s source (the
node that sent the fragment) disconnects from the network. This makes it easier for nodes to
locate file origins when a rating is returned.

5.5 Group-Based Reputation Scheme:
The reputation scheme employed by SARP Net is a simple group-based scheme. Instead of
rating each node individually to attempt to predict node behavior based on previous experiences
noted by other users, this reputation scheme evaluates a group of individuals’ network behavior
and applies the rating to everyone in the group. The basis of this idea comes from the proverb “it
takes a village to raise a child”. In this case, groups are responsible for their group-members
while group-members are responsible for their groups. If a group-member misbehaves, the entire
group suffers. This forces responsible group-leaders to govern their group-members very strictly.
The consequences of group-leaders not maintaining good behaving group-members should see
those group-leaders being demoted and potentially suspended or exiled from the group. Group
leaders have the tools to determine which nodes are misbehaving in the form of interaction
receipts and reputation messages propagating back from other groups.
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Groups that misbehave suffer the consequence of not having queries forwarded and
answered from other groups. Since file queries and file downloads drive the demand of using
file-sharing applications, the lost privilege of file querying severely hurt the group’s
functionality. It is assumed that nodes of misbehaving groups would soon want to participate in
file queries and eventually leave a group to join a reputable one. This is why it is important for
group-leaders to be swift when it comes to filtering out misbehaving nodes.
The rating calculation is relatively simple. Nodes rate good interactions with positive 1,
neutral interactions with a 0, and negative interactions with -1. Positive interactions for file
transfers can be for files that contained no malware and have a file name that accurately
describes the file’s contents. Neutral interactions are for events that could not be determined if it
was a positive or negative event. Negative interactions are for events that were poor, such as
malware distribution and occurrences of dummy files. If a rating is negative then interaction with
that group is not suggested. If a group’s reputation is neutral then it is considered a 50/50 chance
of the node being malicious or information is not gathered about that group. Positive ratings
mean there is a higher chance of a good interaction would occur. It is important to note that since
reputations are solely based on previous interactions with a group’s group-members, the
reputation scheme cannot guarantee that any future interaction will be innocent or malicious.
To prevent any one group’s opinion of another group from dominating an overall
reputation, averages are used to normalize ratings among other groups. We will denote the group
being evaluated as the target group. To calculate a group’s reputation, a node will query the
network for any occurrences of reputations for the target group. After waiting (approximately 1
minute), each returned reputation message is gathered and duplicates are discarded. The
reputation scheme calculates the target group’s rating by summing the average of each returned
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group’s total unique rating of the target then dividing that sum by the number of groups that
returned reputation messages. For example, if group A was the target group and if group B had 2
unique ratings of A {1,0} and group C had 3 unique ratings of A {-1, 1, 1}, the following
calculations would occur. First each group’s rating is averaged: Group B’s average rating of A is
0.5. Group C’s rating of A is 0.333. Second, the two averages are summed and divided by the
number of groups that returned messages: 0.41665. In this case, group A would be considered
trustworthy. For group-leaders evaluating its group-members, a node is considered malicious and
should be punished if its overall rating is negative and 3 or more groups have rated it. This is the
default rule for determining if a node is truly malicious. For any case of negative ratings, groupleaders can configure their own rule set for determining when to punish a node. One such rule
may be evaluating each negative reputation message’s interaction receipts to determine if the
allegation is plausible.
The following represents the equation to determine a group’s reputation rating. Rx is the
overall rating of group x. n is the number of groups with at least one rating of group x. ri,x bar is
the average rating from group i on group x.

By rating groups, node retaliation for setting negative or neutral reputation ratings are
almost eliminated since individual nodes are not being rated. The only form of retaliation could
be entire groups attempting to sabotage other group ratings by flooding the network with false
reputations. For starters, each reputation message needs to have interaction receipts appended to
it to prove that the interaction actually took place. The second tool against this form of retaliation
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is how the system calculates reputations to normalize group responses with other groups. No one
group could dominate the evaluation of another.

5.6 Addressed Security Issues:
Intrusion and Malware Detection: SARP Net was designed to be coupled with an intrusion
detection system (IDS) and an anti-virus software in order to promote security across the
network. If each node is executing some form of these two tools, malware detection and
malicious nodes can be identified faster and more efficiently. The SARP Net client software
should be implemented with the functionality of easily tying itself with an IDS and anti-virus of
the user’s choice. This feature would guarantee that the communication between the applications
would protect the user’s machine and others in the network by constantly monitoring incoming
data. If an anti-virus application could automatically scan files as soon as they are transmitted,
reputations can be generated as quickly based on the outcome of file scans. With SARP Net’s
ability to send messages with an author’s group reputation, security warnings can be propagated
through out the network, alerting nodes of malicious activity and updating both IDS’s and antivirus applications of things to look out for. Of course such alerts would not be the only
verification since even the highly reputable nodes can be malicious, but could be accompanied
by the software or user contacting the IDS or anti-virus’s company directly for verification.

Anonymity as a Security Tool: It is hoped that with an anonymous P2P network, the protection
from identifying user activity would increase a node’s security. Attacks like spyware’s
information gathering on incoming query hits should suffer greatly. This is true since nodes are

50

expected to accept query hits from other nodes with the intention for forward it to the source.
This load of data makes it hard to distinguish the source of a query.
The amount of cover that groups provide their members is essential to protect identities.
The scale of the cover creates a level of deniability nodes can have of query and reputation
making and file possession. The higher the cover: the higher the level of deniability. Groups
fewer than 4 nodes suffer from a higher probability of being able to pinpoint which nodes are
making which queries and sharing which files in its own group. A solution is to prevent groupmembers from replying to fellow group-member queries with hits if the group is too few
connected nodes.
The risk of Sybil attacks [8] are also addressed in SARP Net. With its design, SARP Net
makes it possible for nodes to own more than one identity on the network. The worst case would
be for malicious nodes to create malicious groups with the sole intent to spread malware or to
harm the system. The limitations on group formations, limitations on node invitations, and
monitoring which nodes have created groups should hold against any large collaboration from
misbehaving. Simply put, groups consisting of malicious nodes will receive poor reputations and
will be detected. Once identified, neighboring groups and overseeing LL’s will do their part and
discontinue a group’s privileges if malicious activity is taking place or be judged negatively by
benevolent groups. In the case of a single node performing a Sybil attack, the limitation on the
number of invitations a node can give out prevent a node from creating a lot of identities easily.
By forcing nodes to behave correctly for a set online-time, sharing a set amount of data, and
obtaining positive ratings before gaining the right to invite a new group-member, Sybil attacks
are highly discouraged. In addition, each node is linked to the node that referred it to the
network, just like in F2F networks. A system could be employed to where if a node is detected as
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malicious, its referring node suffers. The blame on introducing malicious nodes can recursively
trek its way to a large degree of referrers to punish nodes of allowing malicious nodes to infect
the system.

5.7 Prototype:
To determine the feasibility of SARP Net, a small prototype of its highlighted features
was implemented. File queries, requests, and their responses were all designed for this prototype.
Interaction receipt exchange and queries, as well as reputation generation and requests were left
out to focus on the transfer of anonymous files and the system’s node join/leave management.
The prototype was designed in Java 5 for portability and consisted of separate client and
bootstrap server applications.
The client application allows users to join groups, share files, make queries, and interact
with other users securely and anonymously. The bootstrap server provides each client with a
single starting entry point to the system. This server is used for nodes that lack any knowledge of
other active nodes on the network. Clients can bypass the bootstrap server by connecting to an
active node’s IP and port if are known. For the sake of testing purposes, the bootstrap server
automatically assigns incoming nodes to groups and which role they should portray. For nodes
who bypass the bootstrap server, if the incoming node belongs to the group of the active node,
the active node will send information about its group-leaders so a connection can be made
between the incoming node and the group-leaders. Here, group-leaders will assign the incoming
node as another group-leader or user-node.
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The bootstrap server has the additional task of providing users who are not running the
client software to query and download files through a website hosted by the bootstrap. With this
feature, users can connect to the network to download files from any computer in the world
without the need to install the client software. To deter users from only using this web feature,
usernames and passwords are required to track the number of downloads. Also, users of the
website are not returned group ratings with their file queries nor are they allowed to rate groups
based on their interactions.
All SARP Net key pairs were generated with the RSA algorithm to provide the necessary
asymmetric keys. Key pair generation was performed by each node upon joining the network for
the first time. After being assigned to a group, a node was given the group’s key pair and
generates its own identification key pair as described earlier. The node’s identification public key
was then sent to the bootstrap server for storage. Any node that needs a public key of any group
or any user can request one from this server. Once all of the needed keys have been exchanged or
generated, a node could participate in the network securely by decrypting incoming data and
encrypting its outgoing messages as explained in the routing protocol.
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Figure 5: SARP Net Prototype: File Query Web Results

During prototype testing, one bootstrap server and 7 client instances were executed on the
3 different computers. The resulting network topology was 2 groups with 3 members each, one
leader-of-leader, and one bootstrap server. Figure 5 displays a screen shot of the results returned
to a web user after a file query with the search string of “pdf”. The green hyperlinks to the far
left of the web browser are the download links for the returned files. These links points to the
hit’s middle-man’s computer and begins the file request process. Queries and requests
originating from web users slightly deviated from the routing protocol described in section 5.3.
These users connect directly from to the middle-man during file requests and forward file queries
to the bootstrap server. Obviously, file queries channeled through the bootstrap server are not
anonymous and can be traced; this being another incentive for users to install and use the client
software.
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The prototype showed that data could easily flow from group-to-group under small and
favorable conditions without any difficulties. It also showed that the system is feasible in node
management and data transfers. The system proved to be able to handle nodes joining and
leaving the system gracefully with the aid of group-members constantly updating each others
statuses. File transfers with both the use of hops for anonymous routing and with the use of the
web feature, proved reasonably successful with files making their way from a source to the query
author.
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CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS
The following section describes the experiments that were performed to analyze the
proposed network and reputation scheme. Section 6.1 is an overview of the P2P simulator that
was developed. Section 6.2 describes the first experiment performed with the simulator. Sections
6.3 and 6.4 discuss experiments 2 and 3 which extend the first experiment with the goal of
increasing transfer speeds.

6.1 Simulator Overview:
A number of simulators were considered to evaluate the performance of SARP Net under
several different configurations, including 3LS [24], P2P Sim [10], and PeerSim [14]. Due to the
desire to simulate the unique features the system possesses in detail, such as the reputation
scheme and interaction receipts, the simulator used in PGS Net [19] was used for its ability to
simulate a network structure similar to SARP Net. This simulator was modified to support the
proposed architecture, its routing protocol, and security mechanisms. The simulator’s design was
heavily influenced by [26] for system comparison detailed later. The simulator was used to
monitor the network behavior and feasibility of the system. The simulator, renamed to SARPSim, is a discrete event simulator fully implemented in Java. Similar to [26], encryption is not
performed at any point in the simulation and nodes joining and leaving the network are not
simulated. The simulator pre-establishes the network with node placement and their web of
interconnectivity.
To examine the different network structures SARP Net can be given, the simulator allows
for the specification of different group sizes and assignments of the three node roles based on
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configured inputs. The characteristics that heavily affect a node’s functionality in the network are
the different bandwidth limitations and number of shared files. Both of these attributes are
randomly selected based on a specified distribution to give nodes the ability to accurately
simulate real user machines on the internet.
Each simulated node is represented by additional real world characteristics such as
bandwidth, listing of shared files, malicious intent, and cache size. Nodes are given a number of
shared files that they will offer to other nodes to download. To simulate this feature, the
randomized number of shared files per node is used to represent the list of files to share. This is a
list of integer numbers ranging between 0 to the number of possible file name combinations
specified by simulator input. For instance, if the number of combinations is 200,000 and node A
has 1,000 files to share, that node has a list of 1,000 randomized numbers between 0 and 200,000
without any duplicates. When another node, node B, queries A for a file, B will randomly select
a number between 0 and 200,000 (call it random_file) and ask A for that file. Node A will
respond with file query hits for every instance of files in the list that are in the range of
(random_file-100, random_file+100) to simulate if B queries non-specific files. An example of
this would be if B is looking for all files that have filenames that contain the word “document”; a
single node may share a lot of files with the phrase “document” in its filename and should reply
with them all.
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6.2 Experiment 1:
SARP Net was simulated using SARP-Sim for 10 runs to determine the average system
statistics. 10 runs were performed since there are a number of random variations per simulation
run. Each run simulated the P2P network for 3600 seconds (1 hour) with 4,000 nodes processing
messages and interacting with each other. Of these 4,000 nodes, 200 groups were formed with 20
group members each. A 5:1 ration of user-nodes to group-leader was used. In addition, each
leader-group was assigned to oversee 3 groups where each leader-group was comprised of the 3
fastest group-members. As recommended by the protocol, leader-of-leaders are the only nodes
prohibited to make file requests and share files. This is to help ease the large workload of
message forwarding and group-governing expected of these leaders.
The method of assigning bandwidth and number of shared files for each node were
comprised of the findings in [23], [26], [17]. 70% of all nodes had high speed internet
connections. Of those nodes, 90% had cable or DSL connections and 10% had T1 or T3
connections. Of the 30% dial-up nodes, 60% possessed 33.6-56kbps connections, 15% possessed
64-128kbps connections, and 25% used 14.4-28.8kbps connections.
The number of shared files was determined by the bandwidth, as influenced by the results
in [23]. The dial-up nodes had a 20% chance of sharing no files, 60% probability of sharing
between 0 and 100 files, 14% chance of sharing between 100 and 1,000 files, and a 6% chance of
sharing 1,000 to 10,000 files. The high-speed nodes had a 10% chance of sharing no files, 60%
chance of sharing 0 to 100 files, 24% chance of sharing 100 to 1,000 files, and 6% chance of
sharing 1,000 to 10,000 files.
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2,500 file queries were processed randomly throughout the simulated time. Each node
was given an equally-likely chance of making any of the 2,500 file queries at any given time.
Each query’s HTL was set to 5. For 20 percent of all query hits returned, the query author
produced a reputation query for the hit source’s group and waited 60 seconds to receive the
group’s rating. If the group’s rating is greater than or equal to 0 then the query source would
issue a file request for the file returned in the hit. Additional file transfer settings include: all file
transfers represent a 1 MB fragment of the queried file, each node has a cache size of 50 entries
(50 MBs each), and the forward probability, probability of a node connecting to a specified
middle-man or forwarding the request to another group-member, was 50%.
To test SARP Net’s ability to locate and punish malicious nodes, all nodes were given a
20% chance of being malicious since this allows for a large proportion of the network to be
benevolent while having a large enough visible proportion of the network misbehaving. All
malicious nodes transfer malware 80% of the time and it is up to the file requestor to detect if a
transferred file is indeed malware. 5% of all files transferred by each innocent node were
malware, the rest are benevolent files. With this said, if a hit’s source transmits a malicious file,
it is assumed that the requestor will be able to detect the malware and will distribute a negative
rating for every occurrence. Group-leaders will disable a node’s file sharing privileges if it has an
overall negative reputation and 3 or more groups have produced ratings on it. This loss of
privilege can represent a node being expelled or suspended from the group.
These experiments focus on malware detection and eliminating the spread of malicious
files by locating its source. Even though a node refusing to forward messages is a problem this
protocol addresses, nodes are not judged on this criterion in the simulation. Instead the load that
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interaction receipts place on the network is monitored for their effect on query response and
transfer speeds.

6.2.1 Results:
The experiment yielded many noteworthy results. The following results are averages over
the 10 runs of the simulator. All experiment data averages and standard deviations can be found
in the appendix.
Search Results: Of the 2,500 file requests, close to 225,422 hits were generated from 404,304
file searches, with about 224,828 of them reaching the file query author. The average time for the
first query hit was 7.11 seconds. These query hits spawned 40,260 file requests resulting in
30,935 uploads attempted, 2,729 downloads completed, and 19,175 file fragments transferred
including downloads from hops and the file request author.
File Transfer and Bandwidth Statistics: Even though the average bandwidth for each node
was 78.05 kB/s, the average download speed was 7.06 kB/s. This download speed was the
average transfer rate from the last hop to the file request author. It took an average of 701.19
seconds for a node to receive a file after issuing a file request. This delay is directly related to the
number of hops from the file request author to the file’s source. It is the time needed for each hop
to receive the file plus the time for locating the file’s source. Finally, the system used less than
21% of its bandwidth to process requests, responses and transfer files over the hour.
Malicious Activity Detection: The system performed relatively well in detecting malicious
activity. Of the close to 800 averaged malicious nodes in the network, just over 112 of them were
correctly detected within an hour. Unexpectedly, an average of 3 benevolent nodes was detected
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malicious per run. This false-positive rate is due to the low probability of 5% that each
benevolent node had to share an unknown version of malware. These nodes beat the odds and
generated overall negative ratings with more than 2 groups. The system was able warn
approximately 4,078 returned hits of being malicious from the hit’s group behavior.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of free and used bandwidth of all nodes over the course of
the simulated hour. This graph proves that as time progresses in the simulation, nodes begin to
issue more and more queries, transmit files, and send reputation and interaction receipt messages.
The decrease in free bandwidth percentage in the first 300 seconds is due to the network
increasing the amount of messages and network activity. Around the 300 second mark, the
bandwidth demand begins to stabilize around 79% free. Towards the end of the simulation, the
free bandwidth percentage begins to increase again since most of the file requests have been
completed.
Figure 6 shows that the increased number of reputations created and the number of
malicious nodes are related since malicious node detection relies on the spreading of reputation
messages. As time progresses, more reputations are made since the number of completed
downloads are increasing. The slower ascent of malicious node detects to number of reputations
in the system is due to the amount of confirmation group-leaders need before declaring a node
malicious.
Figure 7 displays the percentage of network activity from the total bandwidth utilization.
The most bandwidth usage comes from file transfers, making up 42% of all bandwidth
utilization. This large portion is due to the data hopping caused by file requests. With nodes
providing cover for file sources and query authors, the number of hops requires nodes to
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continuously forward file fragments. Interactions make up 38% of the bandwidth utilization
since receipts are spawned from file and reputation queries, requests, hits, and transfers.
Percentage of Bandwidth vs. Time
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Figure 6: Utilized Bandwidth Percentage vs. Time for Experiment 1
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Figure 7: Percentage of Bandwidth Utilization for Experiment 1
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Number of Reputations and Malicious Nodes Detected vs. Time
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Figure 8: Reputations Created and Malicious Node Detection vs. Time (Experiment 1)

6.3 Experiment 2:
After noticing the delay the hops place on file transfers, another experiment was
executed, this time decreasing the size of groups from 20 to 10 nodes, setting the number of
groups to 400 to still simulate 4,000 nodes in the network. An additional change included the
assignment of a group-leader for every three user-nodes. All other simulation settings were kept
the same as the first experiment.
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With the new change in topology, a few statistics were improved while others saw the
opposite. The noteworthy changes include the transfer statistics and malicious activity detection.
Over the 10 runs, experiment 2 produced a faster average file transfer speed of 9.30 kB/s,
compared to experiment 1’s 7.06 kB/s. Also, the average time needed from file request to file
being transferred back to the request author was 664.17 seconds, 37.02 seconds faster than
experiment 1’s. Experiment 2 saw the system only detect slightly over 67 malicious nodes
correctly and an average 1.4 benevolent nodes detected as malicious.

6.4 Experiment 3:
Experiment 2 showed that file transfer speeds could be increased with smaller groups
since there are less nodes to provide cover. These increased speeds were at the cost of fewer
nodes receiving queries due to the HTL set to 5 and also showed a decrease in malicious node
detection. To remedy this, a third experiment was devised, this time increasing the HTL to 6. The
goal of increasing the HTL to 6 was allow more query hits to be generated and increase node
interaction. All other settings were left the same as experiment 2.
Of the 514, 797 file searches from the 2,500 file queries, there were 275, 511 hits. On
average, 7.26 seconds were needed for the first query hit to make its way back to the query
author. The query authors saw an average download speed of 11.3 kB/s and waited 183.79
seconds for each file. Malicious node detection was at its lowest in this experiment. Only 16
malicious nodes were detected of the 796 in the network.
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6.5 Discussion:
After seeing the results the experiments yielded, it is clear that SARP Net can accurately
detect malicious activity with an extremely low false-positive rate. The level of accuracy is high
since the system labeled nodes that transmitted malware as malicious regardless if the node was
initially flagged as benevolent or not. This is because of the probability all nodes had of
transmitting malware. With the high percentage of malicious distribution for malicious users and
the extremely low percentage for benevolent users, benevolent nodes should typically produce
positive ratings. Nodes initially set as malicious should almost always produce negative ratings.
Even though none of the experiments correctly identified all of the malicious nodes and
the simulator assumes every node has an extremely accurate anti-virus, SARP Net’s level of
detection is commendable. Since the system’s rating depends on the number of uploads nodes
perform, the simulation would have to guarantee that each node makes a large number of uploads
to multiple groups to be detected. The reputation scheme works well with detecting nodes that
consistently act maliciously. The true detection takes place at the group level, where groups must
incorporate a set of detection rules described earlier.
It is difficult to compare SARP Net with other anonymous P2P file-sharing systems due
to the system’s goals, design, and functionality. Regardless, SARP-Sim was designed to produce
measurements to compare SARP Net with the experiment results of Freenet described in [26]
and its simulator Eos. Since Freenet and SARP Net are different in functionality (Freenet is an
anonymous distributed data storage and SARP Net is a distributed file-sharing network where
nodes know what files they are sharing and has caching capabilities), file transfers and
bandwidth utilization are the most comparable metrics of the two systems. [26] presented
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modifications to the Freenet design in order to increase file transfer speeds. The paper leaves
doubt of whether the system still protects user identities, so only the results for the original
Freenet protocol will be compared. Freenet’s average download speed was simulated to be
between 9.7 kB/s for the nodes with fast internet connects and 6.2 kB/s for slow, dial-up nodes.
With an average download speed of 7.1 kB/s in experiment 1, 9.3 kB/s in experiment 2, and
11.29 kB/s in experiment 3, SARP Net’s file transfer speeds are very much comparable with
Freenet’s. With about 70% of all nodes in the simulation of Freenet having high speed internet
connections, one can deduce that an average file transfer speed of both fast and slow nodes is
8.65 kB/s. Compared to this average, SARP Net outperforms Freenet by 30.5%. The same could
not be said for total bandwidth utilization. Freenet’s bandwidth utilization for both download and
upload combined averaged 4.98% usage, where SARP Net’s nodes used 20% in experiment 1,
14% in experiment 2, and 17% in experiment 3.
It is gathered that SARP Net’s load on bandwidth utilization does not necessarily mean
the existence of network inefficiency but that nodes are trying to processes more system
functions such as the addition of interaction receipts and reputations than Freenet. One can
conclude that SARP Net’s bandwidth utilization is a tradeoff for its improved security measures
in an anonymous environment.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

7.1 Conclusion:
In this paper, SARP Net, a secure, anonymous, reputation-based, P2P network was
described in detail. The protocol is secure due to the necessity of all nodes exchanging encrypted
messages and incorporating third-party intrusion detection system and anti-virus software to
protect nodes. The anonymity of nodes is guaranteed through the notion of hop making, using
nodes in the network as cover to allow for deniability for network activity. The reputation
scheme incorporated in the system rates collections of nodes as groups and not based on
individual efforts. This sense of group-rating places the emphasis that group overseers (known as
group-leaders in this system) are responsible for detecting and filtering out malicious nodes.
Groups that do not adequately punish malicious activity will suffer in reputation across the
network, limiting its ability to participate in the network fully. The reputation scheme is used to
promote a healthy network setting and can be expanded to aid other network features such as
broadcasting network alerts and distributing malware detection signatures.
Through simulation, the performance of SARP Net under common real-world filesharing conditions was evaluated. The simulation showed that the concept of SARP Net is very
feasible at handling the network load of file queries, responses, interaction receipts, file transfers,
and reputation messages. In comparison to the anonymous distributed data store Freenet, SARP
Net’s file transfers were faster by 30.5% with small group size configurations, while its
bandwidth utilization could be nearly 3 times as high. It is concluded that the additional
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bandwidth usage is the acceptable tradeoff for a more secure, anonymous, data sharing
environment.

7.2 Future Work:
This paper’s focus on file-sharing should not limit the potential of SARP Net. The
protocol is so robust that distributed computing, file storage, and data mining are a few of the
extensions that can be added to the system with relative ease. With this said, SARP Net is a work
in progress. This paper outlines the basic structure and routing protocol of the anonymous
system. Several future enhancements will help booster the performance of the network, increase
its security, and perform better analysis on the system. One such enhancement would be a
completely decentralized method of verifying and distributing encryption keys. Eliminating the
dependence for a long-lived, dedicated server would make the system more fault-tolerant and
eradicate the notion of having a single point of failure.
A second future extension would be to expand the SARP-Sim simulator to compare the
system with a wider range of similar protocols. The analysis comparing SARP Net with Freenet
in these experiments is adequate for initial evaluations but to truly see how well SARP Net
compares with other systems, the simulator will need to gain the capability of simulating other
systems also. This extension would compare SARP Net to other anonymous P2P systems under
the exact same environment with the same workload, providing detailed analysis for
comparisons.
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Experiment 1’s Average Results Over 10 Runs
Average
Standard Deviation
Number of initial file queries:
2500.0
0.0
Number of nodes:
4000.0
0.0
Number of file searches performed:
404304.2
5534.481471646644
Number of hits:
225421.8
6013.063492097852
Number of hits returned:
224827.8
6113.911216234662
Average time for first query hit:
7.1145200000000015
0.07365238353237458
Number of repeated messages ignored:
312642.6
12971.762472385934
Number of file requests:
40260.2
1146.696019004165
Number of uploads:
30934.9
886.9357868526898
Number of downloads:
2729.1
172.95863667362784
Number of file fragments transferred:
19174.8
722.4813907638037
Number of reputations created:
2729.1
172.95863667362784
Malicious Activity
Number of potentially malicious files
4077.7
435.2344310828361
avoided:
Number of malicious files transferred:
523.2
52.17815634918505
Number of pending downloads awaiting
650.2
176.84897511718862
reputations:
Number of malicious nodes in the
799.5
23.070543990118654
network:
Total nodes detected malicious:
115.4
26.306653150866612
Number of malicious nodes detected
112.4
24.747525128788133
malicious:
Number of benevolent nodes detected
3.0
2.0
malicious:
Transfer Statistics
Average bandwidth (kB/sec) :
78.0461317626953
1.3858429796927754
Average file transfer speed (kB/sec) :
7.062409066180429
0.26563754380302523
Average time from file request to
701.1927336489005
16.678891706989166
download complete (sec) :
Average free bandwidth percentage :
0.793335419448687
0.003682867553909222
Average used bandwidth percentage :
0.2066645805513136
0.003682867553909413
Table 1: Simulation Results Averaged Over 10 Runs of Simulator for Experiment 1.
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Experiment 2’s Average Results Over 10 Runs
Average
Standard Deviation
Number of initial file queries:
2500.0
0.0
Number of nodes:
4000.0
0.0
Number of file searches performed:
246855.8
2648.7307073388943
Number of hits:
130138.7
1399.781557958241
Number of hits returned:
129828.8
1374.8142274503855
Average time for first query hit:
6.62388
0.06584467784111334
Number of repeated messages ignored:
51676.1
2093.5280007680813
Number of file requests:
24006.2
304.74047975285464
Number of uploads:
15265.2
252.31837031813598
Number of downloads:
1938.4
154.00792187416855
Number of file fragments transferred:
7238.3
433.55969600505995
Number of reputations created:
1938.4
154.00792187416855
Malicious Activity
Number of potentially malicious files
1517.0
168.7601848778319
avoided:
Number of malicious files transferred:
352.2
35.66174420860539
Number of pending downloads awaiting
434.9
79.32395602842814
reputations:
Number of malicious nodes in the
786.8
24.457309745759037
network:
Total nodes detected malicious:
68.8
14.281456508353763
Number of malicious nodes detected
67.4
13.676256797823008
malicious:
Number of benevolent nodes detected
1.4
1.7435595774162698
malicious:
Transfer Statistics
Average bandwidth (kB/sec) :
78.65115505371095
2.0156175707428714
Average file transfer speed (kB/sec) :
9.301385378457507
0.48468675630299246
Average time from file request to
664.1707861042386
23.97132430102859
download complete (sec) :
Average free bandwidth percentage :
0.8572273556297519
0.003398113633826803
Average used bandwidth percentage :
0.1427726443702491
0.0033981136338265263
Table 2: Simulation Results Averaged Over 10 Runs of Simulator for Experiment 2.
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Experiment 3’s Average Results Over 10 Runs
Average
Standard Deviation
Number of initial file queries:
2500.0
0.0
Number of nodes:
4000.0
0.0
Number of file searches performed:
514797.1
5297.848118812014
Number of hits:
275510.9
5088.118482307581
Number of hits returned:
274562.9
5112.563240684657
Average time for first query hit:
7.2587600000000005
0.07780045244084366
Number of repeated messages ignored:
116688.9
6953.88257666176
Number of file requests:
51414.6
1116.5897366535303
Number of uploads:
32819.4
675.1056509910135
Number of downloads:
711.1
49.50242418306401
Number of file fragments transferred:
8807.0
452.70409761785896
Number of reputations created:
711.1
49.50242418306401
Malicious Activity
Number of potentially malicious files
2477.5
262.90311903817343
avoided:
Number of malicious files transferred:
131.1
14.3
Number of pending downloads awaiting
913.6
153.19477797888544
reputations:
Number of malicious nodes in the
795.8
28.683793333518494
network:
Total nodes detected malicious:
16.6
4.004996878900157
Number of malicious nodes detected
16.4
3.878143885933063
malicious:
Number of benevolent nodes detected
0.2
0.4000000000000001
malicious:
Transfer Statistics
Average bandwidth (kB/sec) :
78.28282055664063
1.124108825079359
Average file transfer speed (kB/sec) :
11.29465568974031
0.4547570667552502
Average time from file request to
183.7886331297139
2.179454822931857
download complete (sec) :
Average free bandwidth percentage :
0.8273814241983551
0.003116775009959704
Average used bandwidth percentage :
0.17261857580164444
0.003116775009959661
Table 3: Simulation Results Averaged Over 10 Runs of Simulator for Experiment 3.
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